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Central and Eastern European Countries have been severely affected by the 2008 financial crisis. 
Several ways of contagion of the financial turmoil worked at different strengths in the different coun-
tries. Although the disparities of the effects of the financial crisis are rather large, there are a number 
of common explanatory features. Mechanisms of transmission of the global financial crisis to the 
CEECs and its effects on these countries are discussed in this paper 
 
1 Introduction 
This memorandum deals with the transmission and 
effects of the worldwide financial crisis in Eastern 
Europe. It is not about the origins of the crisis in the 
US and the direct impact on the industrialized coun-
tries. However, some remarks on the beginning of 
the financial meltdown are provided.  
The second section deals under the heading 
"Contagion: mechanisms and effects" with the ways 
of contagion to the Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs). Firstly, the information about 
external debts, liabilities of the banking system and 
the assessments of the credibility is provided. In 
particular the domestic FX-debts played an impor-
tant role as a mechanism of contagion in Eastern 
Europe. The transmission of the financial turmoil 
through the foreign trade sector is further covered in 
the following subsection "Foreign trade". This sub-
section documents the decline of external demand 
as another mayor mechanism of contagion. 
"Production and forecasts" discusses the production 
effects of the crisis, i.e. the effects on the real do-
mestic economy. Finally, other transmission mecha-
nisms, such as changes in remittances and chang-
ing risk aversion are considered. 
 
 
2 Financial crisis  
The financial crisis started with the so-called 
subprime crisis in the US housing markets 
(July/August 2007). For some reasons banks 
started to provide mortgages to creditors who 
were hardly able to fulfil the debt service. 
Moreover, the mortgages and other debts were 
packed in new financial instruments in order to 
distribute (sell) the risks. The banks who ini-
tially gave the credits were no longer responsi-
ble and interested in the monitoring of the 
debtors. Through the new financial instruments 
the risks were distributed worldwide in particu-
lar in the US and the industrialized West. Once 
it became clear that a large amount of these 
credits would not be paid banks became prob-
lems because their assets deteriorated and 
were not backed by enough equity. The bank-
ing system stopped to lend among them and 
the whole financial system came at the verge 
of illiquidity. Several banks in US were bailed 
out by the US government. But this did not 
happened with Lehman Brothers which de-
clared bankruptcy in September 2009. After-
wards a liquidity and credit crunch developed 
in many countries forcing governments all over 
the world to intervene with bail-outs and guar-
antees for the banking system. The govern-
ment and Central Banks stated to provide the 
necessary money and assets such that the 
debts of the States exploded. In some cases, 
as Iceland, the state itself went bankrupt.  
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Since many banks in Western Europe had 
bought so called toxic assets which were bun-
dles of credits of doubtful value, the crisis im-
mediately hit the banking system and the 
economy of these countries. This was not the 
case in Eastern Europe.  
 
 
3 Contagion: mechanisms and effects 
Although the countries of EE were not affected 
directly through the toxic assets, the crisis 
reached EE also in autumn 2008. There were 
several ways of contagion which worked at 
different strengths in the different countries. 
The direct link between the outside world and 
the domestic economy are the flows summa-
rized in the balance of payments; more pre-
cisely, the trade balance and the capital flows.  
 
 
4 Debts and ratings 
The financial crisis spread through various 
channels to Eastern Europe which is closely 
integrated in the world financial system espe-
cially due to the fact that a large share of East 
European banking system consists of subsidi-
aries or daughters of Western banks. 
The financial crisis led to a reversal of the 
capital flows to Eastern Europe. This sudden 
stop of capital inflows caused a variety of prob-
lems. The reduction of Western banks’ provi-
sion of credits to Eastern Europe led to a gen-
eral reduction of credit growth in Eastern 
Europe. This change in foreign capital inflow 
affected the exchange rate, the prices in the 
asset markets, interest rates, and of course, 
the final demand, particularly investment 
Many banks in Eastern Europe are owned 
by foreign banks, as the following graph 
shows. In particular Swedish, Italian and Aus-
trian banks engaged in Eastern Europe.   
As the financial crisis hit the Western bank-
ing system, the fear grew that banks in trouble 
could try to draw off assets from their East 
European subsidiaries to refinance the mother 
banks. However, this danger did not realize at 
a large scale, it turned out that the dominance 
of Western banks in EE rather mitigated the 
reversal of capital flows. The changes in capi-
tal flows were at least less dramatic than in the 




Graph 1:   Credit growth in Eastern Europe 
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Graph 2:   Market share of majority foreign-owned banks 
  Per cent of total banking assets 
 
Source: Raiffeisen Research, CEE Banking, Sector Report, June 2009 
 
More dangerous was that a significant 
share of credits was denominated in foreign 
currency. In particular in the Baltic States, for-
eign credits made almost half of total credits of 
the banking system. In fact, the loans taken by 
CEECs in foreign currency are central for the 
transmission of the financial crisis.  
There are many reasons why households 
and companies switched to foreign currency 
credits. Primarily, the interest rates for foreign 
currency credits were generally much lower 
than for credits in domestic currency. The risk 
from exchange rate volatility was considered 
low, not least because an accession to the 
euro area was expected in the near future. 
Secondly, the foreign banks often refinanced 
themselves abroad and tried to pass the cur-
rency risk to their clients. Thirdly, many firms 
had foreign currency income from exports and 
households in some countries could count 
remittances in foreign exchange. This deemed 
the risk of foreign currency loans manageable. 
Finally, the regulatory policies, which could 
have prevented or contained high foreign cur-
rency exposure, e.g. by higher reserve re-
quirements for foreign currency loans, were 
not very effective in most countries. 
The exposure to foreign currency credits was 
an important channel to transmit the crisis to 
Eastern Europe. In general, foreign credits had 
contributed substantially to the high credit 
growth in many East European countries. Some 
of them, as the Baltic States, were already over-
heated in 2007. This meant that the total de-
mand, spurred, among other factors, by high 
credit growth, increased faster than the supply. 
The result was labour shortage and increasing 
inflation.  
The situation was aggravated by the dan-
ger of actual devaluation of the domestic cur-
rency. Devaluation means that the interest 
payments and the principal for the foreign cur-
rency credits in domestic currency increase 
proportional to the devaluation. The size of 
debt service and refinancing needs for mature 
loans varies with the exchange rate. Devalua-
tions have dramatically increased these debt 
burdens in the first half of 2009. Unfortunately, 
it is not easy to get a quantitative estimate of 
the relevant debts. Mostly data from the Bank 
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Graph 3:  Countries with net asset outflows in Q1 2009, in bn USD  
Change to previous quarter, exchange rate adjusted 
 
Source: BIS locational dataset 6A; external assets of BIS-reporting banks 
 
Two data sets are available. One reports di-
rect credit, i.e. by BIS headquarter banks, 
which are geographically outside the debtor 
country (locational reporting). Another set of 
statistics counts direct and indirect credits from 
foreign banks outside the debtor country plus 
the credits from foreign banks inside the debtor 
country, i.e. cross-border lending by local sub-
sidiaries (consolidated reporting). In Eastern 
Europe, where a large part of the domestic 
banking system belongs to foreigners, the 
credits on the consolidated basis are much 
larger than the direct (locational) credits.
1 A 
third measure is the external debt which in-
cludes several other items apart from bank 
credits, e.g. inter-company loans.
2 
The graph shows that BIS-banks reduced 
their net assets in many countries significantly 
compared to the previous period. The value of 
outstanding credits from BIS-banks declined in 
all regions of Eastern Europe, but at the same 
time the East European deposits in the BIS-
banks also declined, so that the net effect on 
the net debt of Eastern Europe is ambiguous. 
                                                       
1
 For a discussion about the usefulness of these different 
concepts in assessing the debt burden of East European 
countries see: Erste Group, The real picture of CEE debt, 
Special report, March 6, 2009  
2
 Data on external debt are provided by the Joint External 
Debt Hub: http://www.jedh.org/jedh_creditor.html 
Over the period September 2008 - March 
2009, the following picture emerges for the 
different regions. Net assets of BIS-banks vis-
á-vis the EU-10 (new members) fell between 
September 2008 and March 2009 by 7%, while 
the outflow from the Baltic States was slightly 
higher. This happened mostly because of re-
duced asset holdings of BIS-banks in (credits 
to) the region. 
The situation is different in the CIS region. 
While the CIS states, in particular Russia, were 
still net creditors to BIS-banks in September 
2008, they became net debtors afterwards. In 
total, the net assets of BIS-banks increased in 
this time by 68 bn USD. While gross assets of 
BIS-banks were reduced, the deposits of the 
CIS in the BIS-banks declined more. Similarly 
in the Balkans, net assets of BIS-banks in-
creased by more than 20%. As a result, in-
debtedness against BIS-banks increased in 
the CIS and the Balkans while it fell in the EU-
10 countries. Absicherung bei Nicht-Beschäftigung 
 
Table 1:   Ratings East European countries with a non-investment grade long-term  
  credit rating (foreign currency) from S&P (latest update: Jun, 10, 2010)  
Country   Rating Outlook 
Romania   BB+  stable 
Latvia   BB  stable 
Serbia   BB-  stable 
Ukraine   B  stable 
Source: Standard & Poor’s 
 
 
5 Foreign trade  
The crisis led to a worldwide recession with 
rapidly declining economic activity in the major 
economies. As a result, also the foreign de-
mand in Eastern Europe declined. For the 
open highly internationally integrated small 
countries the reduction of exports had strong 
negative effects on production and employ-
ment. Since it is a worldwide crisis, there is no 
way to compensate declining foreign demand 
of one country by exporting more to another 
country. The strong dependence on exports 
did not only lead to production losses but also 
meant a loss in foreign currency earnings 
which in turn affected the exchange rate.  
In addition to the decline of foreign demand 
for exports, the declining economic activity in 
all major economies led to a drop in the prices 
of most raw materials (in particular of energy) 
in mid 2008. The price of oil dropped from 140 
$/barrel in summer 2008 to 40 $/barrel at the 
end of 2008. The big energy producer in the 
CIS, as Russia, Turkmenistan or Kazakhstan, 
lost a large part of their export revenues due to 
the deterioration in prices.  
 
Table 2:   Growth of GDP and Exports 
 2007  2008  2009*  2010** 
GDP growth in %      
Euro area  2.8  0.6  -4.1  1.0 
CEE 5.5  3.0  -3.7  2.8 
CIS 8.6  5.5  -6.6  4.0 
Growth of Exports in %      
Euro area  6.1  0.9  -14.8  4.7 
CEE 10.0  6.8  -10.8  5.5 
CIS 6.5  1.0  -9.4  7.2 
*Estimates; ** Projections 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010 
 
The reduction of export increased the defi-
cit of the current account, which was already 
high before the crisis. On average, the CEE 
runs a current account deficit of 8% of GDP in 
2008. The decline of exports initially increased 
this gap further. Together with the shrinking 
availability of credits, a stark adjustment of 
imports was required and actually happened. 
Imports were reduced even more than exports 
such that the deficit of the current account, 
which could not be financed any longer, actu-
ally declined to about 3% of GDP in the CEE 
region. The CIS countries, which had a surplus 
before the crisis because of the energy and 
raw material exports also adjusted imports but 
less vigorously such that the surplus in the 
current account declined in 2009. 
 
 
5  Nr. 48 





6 Production and forecasts 
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Source: unece, Eurostat, national statistics 
 
Industrial production is, on average, still 
about 15 per cent below the level of 2008. 
Ukraine and Estonia experienced the biggest 
losses in industrial output. Export oriented 
countries like Germany, which is given for 
comparison, suffer all over the world. Industrial 
output bottomed in most CEECs at the begin-
ning of 2009. Industrial production of most 
countries started to grow again in the second 
quarter.  
While the GDP forecasts for the OECD 
countries became more optimistic as early as 
the latter half of 2009, CEECs’ projections did 
not improve much until the beginning of 2010. 
 The Baltic States, showing double-digit de-
cline in 2009, are obviously hit most by the cri-
sis. The Baltic GDP growth is still expected to 
fall in 2010. Russia and Romania also seem to 
suffer more from the crisis than average Eastern 
Europe. Poland belongs to very few countries 
that avoided a reduction of GDP in 2009.
 3 
                                                       
3
 An earlier track of the fast changing forecast of economic 
growth in Eastern Europe is given in the OEI memorandum 
Nr. 38 (in German) Michael Knogler, Wolfgang Quaisser 
Wachstumsprognosen Mittel- und Osteuropas unter dem 
Einfluss der Finanzmarktkrise, März 2009 Absicherung bei Nicht-Beschäftigung 
 
Table 3:   GDP Growth Estimate 2009 (year over year percent change) 







   Oct 09  Feb 10  Jan 10  Oct 09  Apr 10 
Albania  3           2,8 
Armenia  -14,3           -14,4 
Azerbaijan  5           9,3 
Belarus  -3           0,2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  -3,1     -3     -3,4 
Bulgaria  -6  -5,1  -5,2  -5,9  -5 
Croatia  -5,4     -6  -5,8  -5,8 
Czech Republic     -4,3  -3,9  -4,8  -4,3 
Estonia  -13,2     -15,5  -13,7  -14,1 
Georgia  -5,5           -4 
Hungary  -6,5  -6,2  -6,5  -6,5  -6,3 
Kazakhstan  -1,3  1  -0,9     1,2 
Kyrgyz Republic  1,5           2,3 
Latvia  -16     -17  -18  -18 
Lithuania  -18,4     -16  -18,1  -15 
Moldova, Republic of  -8,5           -6,5 
Montenegro  -4,1           -7 
Poland  1,3  1,7  1,7  1,2  1,7 
Romania  -8  -7,2  -7  -8  -7,1 
Russian Federation  -8,5  -7,9  -8,6  -7,2  -7,9 
Serbia  -4     -3,2     -2,9 
Slovakia  -6     -5  -5,8  -4,7 
Slovenia  -7,8     -7,8  -7,4  -7,3 
Tajikistan  2           3,4 
FYR Macedonia  -1,6        -2  -0,7 
Turkmenistan  6           4,1 
Ukraine  -14  -15  -14     -15,1 
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Table 4:   GDP Growth Forecast 2010 (year over year percent change) 







  Oct 09  Feb 10  Jan 10  Oct 09  Apr 10 
Albania  1,6           2,2 
Armenia  1,3           1,2 
Azerbaijan  7,1           7,4 
Belarus  0,9           1,8 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  0,8     -1     0,5 
Bulgaria  -1,5  -1,5  -1,5  -1,1  -2,5 
Croatia  1,5     -1  0,2  0,4 
Czech Republic     2  1,6  0,8  1,3 
Estonia  0,1     -3,9  -0,1  -2,6 
Georgia  2           2 
Hungary  -0,9  0,3  -0,3  -0,5  -0,9 
Kazakhstan  1,6  2  2,5     2 
Kyrgyz Republic  3           3 
Latvia  -1,2     -4  -4  -4 
Lithuania  -3     -5,5  -3,9  -4 
Moldova, Republic of  1,5           0 
Montenegro  0,1           -2 
Poland  1,8  2,4  2,3  1,8  2,2 
Romania  1  1,5  0,4  0,5  0,5 
Russian Federation  3,1  3,8  2,7  2,3  3,6 
Serbia  1     -0,5     1,5 
Slovakia  3,5     2,6  1,9  3,7 
Slovenia  2,6     0,6  1,3  0,6 
Tajikistan  3           3 
FYR Macedonia  2        1,5  2 
Turkmenistan  13           15,3 
Ukraine  3  2,7  2     2,7 
Uzbekistan  7           7 
Sources: UniCreditGroup, CEE Quarterly Q1/2010; Deutsche Bank Research Country Infobase; European Commission, Euro-
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7 Other transmission mechanisms 
7.1 Remittances 
Table 5:   Remittances as a share of GDP, 2007  
Armenia 9.2%  Albania 13.6% 
Azerbaijan 4.1%  Croatia  2.7% 
Georgia  6.8%  Bosnia & Herzegovina  17.8% 
   Macedonia,  FYR  4.5% 
Estonia 2.0%  Serbia 13.9% 
Latvia 2.0%     
Lithuania 3.7%  Moldova 34.1% 
Bulgaria 5.4%  Tajikistan  45.5% 
Hungary 1.8%     
Poland 2.5%     
Romania 5.1%     
Slovak Republic  2.0%     
Source: The World Bank, Migration and Remittances  
 
For some countries in central Asia and the 
Balkans a substantial source of income comes 
from the citizens who work abroad and send 
money to their families. Due to the recession in 
the economy of the host countries it is ex-
pected that the foreign workers will be first to 
be laid off when the declining demand leads to 
a reduction of labour force. As a result, the 
flow of remittances is expected to decline sig-
nificantly in 2009 and 2010.
4 As can be seen 
from the table, this would affect the income of 
the sending countries substantially. 
 
 
7.2 Asset prices and increasing risk aver-
sion 
The outflow of capital to foreigners started with 
the sale of East European bonds and stocks. 
The stock markets in Eastern Europe are 
mostly driven by US and West European in-
vestors. The stock markets in Eastern Europe 
collapsed even more than its West European 
and US counterparts. Despite the high foreign 
share in the stock market, the decline of stock 
prices was also felt in the domestic economy. 
Banks, companies and households had to 
                                                       
4
 A detailed account of the situation is given in the OEI 
memorandum Nr. 42 Barbara Dietz, Migration, remittances 
and the current economic crisis: implications for Central 
and Eastern Europe, July 2009 
adjust to declining wealth, which by and large 
exacerbated the general decline of demand.  
In some countries, in particular the Baltic 
countries, the vast credit growth were corre-
lated to rapid increase in house prices. Al-
though it remains unclear whether the real 
estate price level shows some overshooting, in 
the wake of the ongoing crises, the prices for 
housing dropped in Latvia more than 60% from 
its peak-level, and 25% in Lithuania. Declining 
real estate prices triggered other risks as the 
ability to repay loans and a decreasing value of 
collateral. 
Although not as dramatic as in the US and 
Western Europe, declining asset prices also 
fostered the recession in Eastern Europe.  
On a more general level asset prices were 
influenced by an increase in risk aversion. 
Investors worldwide reassessed the risks and 
tried to invest their money in safe assets. The 
flight to safety was at the expense of the 
emerging economies since assets were shifted 
from these countries to more stable currencies 
and assets. The higher risk aversion demands 
show up in a risk premium which has to be 
paid on top of a normal (risk free) asset. It 





Graph 5:   Yield spreads of selected East European countries in basis points  








Q1 08 Q2 08 Q3 08 Q4 08 Q1 09 Q2 09 Q3 09 Q4 09
Hungary Poland Russia Serbia Ukraine
 
Source: IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, April 2010, Statistical Appendix, Table 13 
 
 
This development can be quantified by dif-
ferent measures. The simplest way is to calcu-
late the spread between a yield of a risky asset 
and a risk free one. For example, the difference 
of yield for an East European government 
bonds and a US Treasury bond of same matur-
ity. The higher the yield or the bigger the yield 
spread the riskier is the East European bond. 
Graph 5 shows the development of the yield 
spread in the last 1.5 years. As can be seen, the 
yield of the Ukrainian bond was 27 percentage 
points (= 2700 basis points) higher than a US 
bond at the end of 2008/beginning of 2009. At 
this time, the chance that the Ukraine defaulted 
on their debts was considered pretty high.
5 But 
also the risk of other east European countries 
increased at that time significantly. 
The data also demonstrate that it became 
more and more difficult or costly for the East 
                                                       
5
 Since 2008 the OEI-website provides monthly updated 
information (in German) about the Ukrainian economy in 
the section "Spotlight Ukraine".  
Papers on the effects of the financial crisis in Ukraine and 
policy recommendations can be found at 
http://www.sigmableyzer.com/publications/presentations. 
The IMF review of Ukraine under the standby arrangement 
from June 2, 2009 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=22994.0 
European countries to get credit from outside. 
They had to pay a high risk premium for the 
credits. Mid-2009 the situation on the financial 




8 Concluding remarks 
In the light of the rather large differences of the 
effects of the financial crisis in Eastern Europe, 
one might wonder if they can be explained by 
the above mentioned factors. An additional 
explanation of the data relies on the domestic 
economic development before the crisis. As 
mentioned before, many countries, in particular 
the Baltics had experienced a credit-driven 
boom which was already on the downturn. 
Policy in these overheated countries (meaning 
the demand was higher than the production 
capacity) had already started to reduce de-
mand when the crisis hit. The external factors 
aggravated the internal policy in such a way 
that the compounded effect led to the crisis 
results. This explanation states that the al-
ready existing boom-bust cycle in the countries 
was just amplified by the outcomes of the 
worldwide crisis. Absicherung bei Nicht-Beschäftigung 
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